Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1953

The State of Utah v. Spring City et al : Brief of
Spring City Respondents
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Don V. Tibbs; Attorney for Respondents;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, State v. Spring City, No. 7942 (Utah Supreme Court, 1953).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1877

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH by and through
its Treasurer,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
SPRING CITY, an municipal corporation,
and HYRUM JENSEN, its Mayor~
CLAUD ACORD, ROYAL ALLRED,
CUTLER SCHOFIELD, HENRY SCHOFIELD and VIRGUS OSBORNE, its Counc i I men, and CHARLES THOMPSON,
ROYAL ALLRED, VIRGUS OSBORNE,
MAX BLAIN, LOWELL HANSEN, ALLEN BECK and HENRY BLAIN,
Defendants and Respondents.

CIVIL
No. 7942

BRIEF OF SPRING CITY RESPONDENTS

,.r . .-;-·•
I

·l. ·;

;

DON V. TIBBS
.· . ·-·~'Attorney for Respondents, Spring
~~j_)i City and it's Councilmen

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page
STATEMENT OF POINTS --------------·-----·-----·---···-·····-·-··---- 3 & 4

POINT I

THE BONDS, SERIES OF JANUARY 15, 1948
ISSUED BY THE DEFENDANT SPRING CITY ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID BECAUSE THE
THE DEBT LIMIT IMPOSED BY ARTICLE X IV,
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, WAS EXCEEDED ------·---·---··

4

POINT II

IF THE BONDS, SERIES OF JANUARY 15,
1948, BE VOID IN AN ABSENCE OF AN ELECTION
AUTHORIZING THE ISSUE, PLAINTIE'E' IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECO·VER UPON THE THEORY OF
MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED -··-----------~-----------------------------

13

ARGUMEN'T ... ····----- ~---------------- _____ .--------- ___________________________ -.----- ___

13

CONCLUSION -----------------------·--·--------------------·--------------------··-------- 14
I

·1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CASES CITED AND REFERENCES
Page
Constitution of Utah
Article XIV, Sec. 3 ________________________ 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14

Article XIV, Sec. 4 --------------------------------------------------------

5

Utah Code Annotated, 1933
Title 15, Chapter 8, Section 6 --------------------------~~~----~-- 12
(Now 10~8-6 U.C.A. 1953)
Barnes v. Lehi City
74 U. 321, 340, 279 P. 878

5

Dickinson v. Salt Lake City
195 P. 1110, 57 U. 530 ------------------------------------------------ 13
Fritsch v. Board of Comr's of Salt Lake County et al.
15 U. 83, 47 P. 1926 -----------------------------·---------- 5, 7, 9, 13
McNeil v. Waco
89 Tex. 83, 33 S.W. 322. 90 A.L.R. 1240 -------------------- 10
Morton v. Nevada
41 Fed. 582 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 13
Muir v. Murray City
55 Utah 368, 186 Pac. 433 -------------------·-------· 7, 8, 12, 13
Wilson v. Shreveport
29 La. Ann. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 11

2

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH by and through
its Treasurer,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
SPRING CITY, an municipal corporation,
and HYRUM JENSEN, its Mayor~
CLAUD ACORD, R 0 Y A L ALLRED,
.. CUTLER SCHOFIELD, HENRY SCHOFIELD and VIRGUS OSBORNE, its Counc i 1m en, and CHARLES THOMPSON,
ROYAL ALLRED, VIRGUS OSBORNE,
MAX BLAIN, LOWELL HANSEN, ALLEN BECK and HENRY BLAIN,
Defendants and Respondents. ,

CIVIL
No. 7942

BRIEF OF SPRING CITY RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT O·F PO·INTS

POINT 1
THE BO·NDS, SERIES OF JANUARY 15, 1948, ISSUED
BY THE DEFENDANT SPRING CITY, ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID BECAUSE THE DEBT LIMIT IMPOS3
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ED BY ARTICLE XIV, SECTION 3, CONSTITUTION OF
UTAH, WAS EXCEEDED.
POINT II
IF THE BONDS, SERIES OF JANUARY 15, 1948, BE
VOID IN AN ABSENCE OF AN ELECTION AUTHORIZING THE ISSUE, PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER UPON THE THEORY OF MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE l30NDS, SERIES OF JANUARY 15, 1948, ISSUED
BY THE DEFENDANT SPRING CITY, ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID BECAUSE THE DEBT LIMIT IMPOSED BY ARTICLE XIV, SECTION 3, CONSTITUTION
OF UTAH, WAS EXCEEDED.
The Appellant, the State of Utah, has in its brief, set
out the facts, pleadings, proceedings and evidence in an able
and satisfactory manner. The Respondent, Spring City, will
address itself to the problem whether or not Section 3, Article
14, of the Constitution of the State of Utah has been violated,
and if the said violation makes the bonds issued by Spring
City and purchased by the State of Utah void. Section 3 of
Article 14, is set out as follows:
No debt in excess of the taxes for the current year
shall be created by any county or subdivision thereof,
or by any school district therein, or by any city,
town, or village, or any subdivision thereof in this
State; unless the proposition to create such debt,
shall have been submitted to a vote of such qualified
4
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electors as shall have paid a property tax therein,
in the year preceeding such election, and a majority
of those voting thereon shall have voted in favor of
incurring such debt.
The Respondent, Spring City, agrees with the Findings
of Fact of the Court and is willing to rely upon them
in determining the law question involved.
There are two constitutional limits of indebtedness,
one which the city can incur without a bond election, which
bonds must be paid for from the revenues of the current
year in which issued, and another limitation on the amount
the city can become indebted if the indebtedness is authorized by a bond election.
It is very clear that the purpose of Section 3 and
Section 4 of Article 14, is to serve as a limit to taxation and
as a protection to taxpayers. (Barnes v. Lehi City, 74 U.
321, 340. 279 P. 878.). At the time the Constitution was
framed, the history of the COWltry and of the people in
this territory afforded examples of municipal corporations
which had become bankrupt through the reckless and extravagent management of their governing bodies. The framers of the Constitution had undoubtedly considered the evils
which resulted to both the taxpayers and the creditors of
municipal corporations from the unlimited power in creation
of debts. They must have agreed that the policy to follow
was that the municipalities must pay as they go, and that
they should go only so far as they can pay.
In a Utah case entitled Fritsch v. Board of Com'rs.
of Salt Lake County et al, 15 U. 83, 47 P. 1026, this Court
5
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construed Section 3, of Article 14, and stated in effect that
no debt shall be created by any county during the year,
without a vote of the taxpayers, which the revenues of
the year will not pay. The Court also said:
"2. The language of Section 3, Art. 14, Const., that
'no debt, in excess of the taxes of the current year,
shall be created,' cannot be held to mean that the
county may expend the entire revenue of the year,
and in addition thereto create indebtedness equal to
the tax levy of the year. A debt cannot be incurred
_in one year, floated over into the next, and paid out
of its revenues, without. a vote. The indebtedness of
the year must be paid out of its revenues.
"4. The language of the constitutional provision, 'no
debts in excess of the taxes for the current year shall
be created' (Article 14, Sec. 3) means all debts which
cannot be paid out of the revenues of the year. In
determining when the limit is reached, liabilities imposed by .the law should be taken into consideration,
as well as by those created by contract.
"8. County warrants or county bonds issued without
authority of law are not valid in the hands of persons
receiving them, or to whom they may have been assigned. Such persons in a legal sense, cannot be innocent holders."
It is the respondent's (Spring City) position that the
case in issue is the situation that the framers of our Constitution sought to prevent, by enacting into law Section 3. That

6
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it is the situation the Court had in mind when it ruled in
Fritsch v. Board of Comr's.
Spring City has now in force several bond issues where
the council authorizing same ignored Section 3, Article 14,
of the Constitution of the State of Utah, and borrowed money
without the consent of the taxpayers, used it, and in the
bonds evidencing the obligation, stated that a future administration would pay the obligation. The time finally came
when the future administration did not have the funds to
pay on the bonds, and had no way in which to get the
money to pay off the indebtedness.
There is no question but that Spring City received
the money under this bond proceeding. However, no way
was provided for in the original bond proceedings for the
money to be raised or taxed, and there being no way
under the laws of the State of Utah to tax the people to
pay it back, repayment became impossible. If Section 3,
Article 14, of the Constitution of the State of Utah had
been followed as construed by this Court in Fritsch v.
Board of Comr's., the situation that Spring City is now in
would never have occured.
The appellant, by its argument would have the Court
affirm this bond proceeding and this type of financing,
basing its argument upon the Courts decision in the case
of Muir vs. Murray City, 55 Utah 368, 186 Pac. 433. In
that case the Court held in essence that the time of payment, even though in successive years, would not void an
obligation under Section 3, Article 14, of our Constitution.
It is our opinion that the court was correct in its ruling
in that case, but that it, in no way, reverses the rules laid

7
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down in the Fritsch case. In the Muir case there was no
evidence to show that the moneys that could be reached
were not from the revenues of the year in which th obligation was created, and also in the Muir case, there were
moneys that could be reached. It is the opinion of the respondent that because of misconstrueing the Muir case,
bonds similar to the one in -issue have been placed on the
market, and such a practice is directly responsible for the
financial break-down of Spring City.
It must be kept in mind that when this present Spring
City obligation was created, there was no method provided
in the bonds or the ordinance creating same for the repayment of principal and interest, and that on the face it was
stated that payment was to be made in 1961 and thereafter, a time more than 10 years in the future. The proposition to create the indebtedness was never submitted to a
vote of the taxpayers. At the present time, Spring City
is taxing its citizens the maximum allowed under the law
for the payment of indebtedness. All of the revenues from
the power plant and- water works are pledged to the payment of other obligations, which are in effect mortgages
on the respective systems. That because of several obligations created in a like manner as the obligation in issue
the city was and is in such a financial condition that to continue
to operate, it became necessary to adopt a pay as you go
policy, and to refuse payment on this illegal bond issue.
The appellant argues that the obligation was valid
when it was created in that it was dated January 15, 1948,
and as of that date the sum of $13,498.67 was within the
unexpended revenues for the year 1 9 4 8. The appel-

8
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lant refuses to take into consideration the necessary operating expenses of t h e City that were spent during the
year 1948. Fritsch vs. Board of Com'rs. of Salt Lake County
clearly holds that in determining the debt limit, the liabilities imposed by the law and by contract should be taken
into consideration. It necessarily follows that the operating
expense of the City should be allowed. There is no evidence before the court that the expenditures of Spring City
in 1948, other than the funds received under the bond
issue, 'vere not the regular operating expenses, and the
Court held that there are no funds from 1948 that are
not now expended.
Financing municipalities based upon borrowing procedures, that the appellant, by inference, proposes in his
brief, runs contrary to common sense. Pyramiding indebtedness for a future generation to pay, without providing a
means of payment, is certainly not what was meant by
Section 3, Article 14, Constitution of the State of Utah. It
is therefore our position that in determining the debt limit
the probable expenditures and operating expenses for the
year must be taken into consideration. Fritsch vs. Board
of Com'rs ....
The appellant, by refusing to recognize the expenses
of the respondent during the year 1948, is able to assume
that the Bonds here in issue are valid. It is then an easy
matter to cite cases holding that the bonds should be paid
by the City, especially where the City has funds or the
ability to tax. Spring City is in neither of these situations.
Appellant also argues that to hold this bond issue
void would be, in ·effect, placing in jeopardy what we call
9
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the "tax anticipation" bond. This is not so. The "tax anticipation" bond is payable solely out of the revenues of the
year for which it is borrowed, and, as such, is collectable
only out of· those respective revenues. The bond in issue
is borrowing money to be paid by future generations, and
there is no way that the said obligations are to be paid
without a bond election.
Appellant argues that because the bond proceedings
stated that this was a required expenditure it wasn't to be
a debt within the meaning of the Constitution. In McNeil
vs. Waco, 89 Tex 83, 33 S.W. 322 .. See 90 A.L.R. 1240
... , The court said:
"We conclude that the word 'debt' as used in the
constitutional provisions above quoted, means any
pecuniary obligation imposed by contract, except
such as \vere, at the date of the contract within the
lawful contemplation of the parties, to be satisfied
out of the current revenues for the year, or out oi
some fund within the immediate control of the corporation..... Prima facie, every pecuniary obligation attempted to be created by contract is a debt,
within the meaning of the constitutional provisions
above; and a party attempting to recover against
the city thereon must allege the facts showing a compliance with the Constitution and statutes necessary
to bind the city, or must allege such facts as to bring
the particular claim within the exception above stated in the definition of the word 'debt'. If it should
appear from the pleadings or the face of the obli-

10
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gation, that the subject . of the contract was clearly
a matter of ordinary expenditure, such as repairing
streets or salary of an officer, this would be sufficient
to bring it within the exception, for the prima facie
presumption would be that such claim was intended
to be paid out of the current revenues annually
collected for the payment of such claims, and it would
not be presumed the city has attempted to make contracts in excess of its. revenues for the year; but
where as in the case at bar, the subject of the contract
is not one which the court can say, as a matter of law,
is an item of ordinary expenditure, the petition, in
order to bring it within the exception, must allege
some additional fact, such as that there was, at the
date of contract, a fund in the treasury, legally applicable thereto, out of which the parties contemplated
that such claim should be paid."
This A.L.R. citation deals with failure to comply with
statutory requirements that a municipality at or before incurring indebtedness provide for a tax for its payment as
affecting validity of indebtedness or obligations issued therefore. In Wilson vs. Shreveport, 29 La. Ann. 673, it was
held that under this type of statute, bonds issued without
levying a tax to provide for their extinguishment were a bsolute nullities, unforceable even in the hands of a transferee in good faith for valuable consideration, before maturity. The court said:
"Those who contract with municipal corporations knov1
that these bodies act validly only 'vithin the powers
11
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conferred upon them by the special laws by which
they are created; and the creditor of a corporation
is bound to see that the contract or obligation of
which he claims the benefit is within the power which
the corporation may lawfully exercise. The fact that
the obligation is in the shape of negotiable instrument,
or that it was acquired in good faith, for a vaulable
consideration, before maturity, in no manner enlarges
the power of the corporation, or gives any additional
force or validity to its unauthorized acts."
We submit that the obligation was invalid when it
was created, that the only argument for validity comes from
misconstruction of the case of Muir vs. Murray City. Respondent calls the courts's attention to the Revised Statutes
of Utah, 1933, Annotated, Title 15, Chapter 8, Section 6,
Borrowing Power of Cities, where in the note to said section
it is stated as follows:
Const. Art. 14, Sec. 3, prohibits a city from creating
an indebtedness in excess of its revenues for the current year, unless the proposition is submitted to a
vote and approved by the electors. But the inhibition
only goes to the question of excess amount, not to
the time of the payment. If the amount of indebtedness is limited to revenue for the current year, payment may be provided for after the year expires. If
a city has no power to incur an indebtedness, it is not
only justified but it is its duty to set up the defense
of ultra vires. Taxes do not become due for a number
of months after the fiscal year for cities commences

12
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(15-8-86) and a city may borrow in anticipation of
its revenues for corporate purposes. Muir vs. Murray
City, 186 P. 433, 55 U. 368. Dickinson vs. Salt Lake
City, 195 P. 1110, 57 U.530."

POINT II
IF THE BONDS, SERIES O·F JANUARY 15, 1948,
SHOULD BE VOID IN AN ABSENCE OF AN ELE.CTION
AUTHORIZING THE ISSUE, PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER UPON THE THEORY OF MONEY
HAD AND RECEIVED.
The appellant argues that ·if the bond issue is void
because there was no bond election, then he is entitled to
recover upon the theory of money had and received.
If the object of Section 3 of the Constitution of the
State of Utah is the protection of the taxpayers, to prevent
taxing the people without their consent, and to keep municipalities on a pay as you go principle, how can the constitutional inhibition be made effectual if the purchaser of the
forbidden claim can come in the form of a suitor for money
had and received rather than in the action of indebitatus assumsit? Is it the cause of action, rather than the form of action, which determines the right? In either case, the municipality and the people residing therein would be required to pay
the judgment. Such distinction would sacrifice substance to
form, and its practical result inevitably would be a nullification of the Constitution. What the law forbids municipal bodies to do directly should not be permitted by indirect methods. Morton vs. Nevada. 41 Fed. 582.
It is the opinion of the respondent that Fritsch vs.

13
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Board of Com'rs. also negatives such a view for setting at
naught the provisions of the Constitution. The error of
following such a view could only be based upon want of
attention to the object and purpose of the constitutional restriction in question.
CONCLUSION
The respondent, Spring City, submits the decision of
the Court, as based upon its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of the Law. There being only one question to decide;
was section 3 of Article 14, of the Constitution of the State
of Utah violated by the bond proceedings in issue? To hold
that it wasn't violated, would be to set up a precedent for
poor financing and to encourage other municipalities to make
the same mistake that Spring City made. I£ the Court, however, rules that the bond issue is valid, the respondent respectfully requests the Court to tell us how to pay it.
Respectfully submitted,

DON V. TIBBS
Attorney for Respondent Spring
City and the City Council.
Manti, Utah
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